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NOTES
The Invasion of Privacy-Ohio's New Tort
INTRODUCTION
ANY ATTEMPT to define the relatively new tort of invasion of pri-
vacy is burdened at the outset by the embryonic state of the body of law
now being formed about it. Essentially it protects the right to live as one
chooses as long as one does not infringe upon the rights of others, and to
be let alone in so doing. The law, in recognizing the right of privacy,
seeks to prevent the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's
personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public
has no legitimate concern, and the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame
or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.'
In an era of unprecedented progress in science and technology such as
the twentieth century, the need for privacy is evident. Increasing techno-
logical advancement in all areas of communication and transportation
makes possible myriad intrusions today, for the radio, television, motion
picture and press are ubiquitous. The tort of the invasion of privacy re-
flects the contemporary struggle between the interest of the public and
press in dissemination of news and the interest of the individual in the in-
1 138 AIR 32.
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violateness of his personality.2 From the conflict of these two forces, the
right of privacy was born. The courts must now shape it with wisdom to
an enlightened maturity.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Greek law, every infringement of the personality of another was
contemptuous; the gravamen being the injury to honor or the insult, not
the injury to the body. In Roman law, one of the forms of m4uta was
symbolic injury which did harm to the honor and dignity of a person, and
such symbolic injury could be committed by acts, gdstures or words which
contained the element of insult, indignity, or disrespect 3 Thus in the
ancient law we find rights that were essentially of the same nature as the
right of privacy given recognition and effect. Although the extent of the
right of privacy in the civil law is somewhat vague, some such right seems to
be generally recognized.4
While the right of privacy has not been accepted in England as such,
it has been given protection under the guise of some legally recognized
interest such as property5 or contract.6 The same is still true of a few con-
servative American courts7 although the lack of precedent inspiring such
fictions no longer exists. In 1890 there appeared in the Harvard Law
Review an article by Warren and Brandeis.8 The authors reviewed a num-
ber of cases in which relief had been afforded on the basis of some other
legally recognized right, and concluded that they were in reality based upon a
2 See RmsMAN, THE LONELY CROwD, p. 74 (1950); "The wider ambit of taste
socialization today is shown in still another decisive change from the era depending
on inner-direction. Then, by the rules of etiquette and class, certain spheres of life
were regarded as private: it was a breach of etiquette to intrude or permit intrusion
on them. Today, however, we must be prepared to open up on cross-examination al-
most any sphere in which the peer-group becomes interested. Whereas etiquette
built barriers between people, socialized exchange of consumer taste requires that
privacy either be given up, or be kept, like a liberal theologian's God, in some in-
terstices of one's nature. Before the peer-group jury there is no privilege against
self-incrimination."
' Pound, Interests of Personaity, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).
'See Gutteridge, The Comparatwe Law of the Right to Prwacy, 47 L. Q. REv. 203
(1931).
'Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849) (exhibition
of etchings and publication of catalogue); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng.
Rep. 670 (1818) (publication of private letters).
'Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888) (sale of customer's photo-
graph); Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1824) (publication of oral
lectures).
7 McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1937); U.S. Life In-
surance Co. v. Hamilton, 238 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
'Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Prwacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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broader principle which was entitled to independent recognition. They
asserted the capacity of the common law for growth and expansion, and
urged the courts to abandon the property and contract fictions and affirm
the independent existence of the right of privacy.
The first American decision on this subject in a court of last resort,
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,9 reflected the resistance of con-
servative jurists to this incipient movement of tort law. But the vigorous
dissent of the Roberson case recognized the new conditions of a more com-
plex society, and the dissent was later followed in the leading case of Pave-
swh v. New England Life Ins. Co.,10 the first American case in a court of
last resort to affirm the independent legal existence of the right of privacy.
In a prophetic mood, the Pavessch court said: "We venture to predict that
the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view
was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability."'11
THE LAW TODAY
As the law of privacy develops, greater crystallization of the situations
in which the interest will be protected must necessarily follow. At the
present tune the right is protected in four basic instances:
(1) Intrusion upon plaintiff's physical solitude, such as invading quar-
ters' 2 or tapping telephone wires;13
(2) Publicity which violates the ordinary decencies, such as pub-
lishing pictures of plaintiff's humiliating illness, 14 or of his de-
formed child;15
(3) Putting plaintiff in a false but not necessarily defamatory light,
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) The
court, fearful of the lack of precedent, a possible flood of litigation, and the mental
character of the injury, said: "There are many moral obligations too delicate and
subtle to be enforced in the rude way of giving money compensation for their viola-
tion. Perhaps the feelings find as full protection as it is possible to give in moral
law and a responsive public opinion."
l Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). In recog-
nizing the plaintiff's right of privacy, the court said that the absence for a long period
of time of a precedent for an asserted right is not conclusive evidence that the right
does not exist. Where the case is new in principle the courts cannot give a remedy,
but where the case is new only in instance, it is the duty of the courts to give relief
by the application of recognized principles.
"Id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
"Walsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Walker v. Whittle, 83
Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951), Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E.
905 (1924).
'Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931)
1
'Barber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942)
'Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930)
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such as signing his name to a letter,16 or including his picture in
a rogues' gallery;"v
(4) The appropriation of some element of plaintiffs personality for
commercial use, such as advertising.' 8
But the right of individual privacy is by no means absolute. It is at-
tended by several limitations which represent the conflicting interests of
society. Probably the most important of these limitations is the consti-
tutionally protected freedom of the press to publish newsworthy items of
public interest.'9 Yet, under the better view, this privilege to disseminate
news should not be abused so as to violate common decencies.20
A further limitation on the right of privacy exists when the plaintiff
is a public figure. Scrutiny is permitted of the private life of any person
who has achieved or has had thrust upon hu the vague and indefinable
status of a "public figure"21 even after a lapse of time has resulted in his
return to "private life."22  But under the better-reasoned cases a public
figure does not surrender or waive his right of privacy completely.23
" Hinish v. Meier, 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
"
t State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J.
Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945).
' Pallas v. Crowley-Milner and Co., 322 Mich. 411, 54 N.W.2d 595 (1948); Flake
v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.F. 55 (1938); Eick v. Perk Dog Food
Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed,
119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
"In Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), affirmed, 113
F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940), the court, while denying plaintiff relief because he was a
"public figure," wisely recognized that the newsworthiness of the matter printed
might not always constitute a complete defense, and that revelations may be so inti-
mate and so unwarranted as to outrage the community's sense of decency.
-' Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273, 231 P.2d 565 (1951); Barber v. Time, 348
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942) (in which plaintiff was humiliated by having
her illness publicized and her picture printed with the caption "starving glutton");
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (in which plaintiff was
subjected to scorn and suffered severely because her former life as a prostitute was
publicized in a film).
'Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107A.2d 860 (1954); Stryker v. Republic
Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App.2d 191,238 P.2d 670 (1952); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal.
App.2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1950).
'Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), affirmed, 113 F.2d
806 (2nd Cit. 1940) held that an infant prodigy who in later life sought to conceal
his identity through his chosen career as an obscure derk could not recover for in-
vasion of privacy by a published autobiographical sketch, since his previous status as
a public figure continued to make hun newsworthy. Accord, Smith v. Doss, 251
Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948).
'Garner v. Triangle Publications Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Mau v.
Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Melvin v. Reid 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
19561
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A final limitation to the right is also discovered in the requirement that
the plaintiff be a person of ordinary sensibilites, 24 and it cannot -be ex-
tended to supersensitiveness or to recluses who desire to shun the world
completely.
The right of privacy may be surrendered by consent or waiver,25 and
since it is a personal right which abates on death, the surviving relatives
have no cause of action unless they themselves are brought into undesired
publiclty.2 6 Unlike an action for defamation, truth is no defense in an
action for invasion of privacy,27 and, once the tort is established, no special
damages are necessary- substantial damages will be awarded for mental
suffering alone.28
The law has attempted to guard privacy in several other forms, all of
which fall short of the protection which the tort of invasion of privacy
contemplates. The constitutional guaranty against unreasonable search and
seizure found in both the federal and many state constitutions prevents only
to a limited extent an unwarranted intrusion upon plaintiff's physwal soli-
tude, and even this guaranty has been held not to extend to the placing of
a detectaphone in the wall next to plaintiff's room, since there was no
physical entry on plaintiff's premises.29 The Federal Wiretapping Stat-
ute,30 which prohibits the unauthorized interception, publication or use of
a communication, has been held to impose a civil liability, although not
expressly, on one who publishes a telephone message without authoriza-
tion,3 ' but again this protection of privacy is extended to only a very limited
area. An action for defamation, in which truth is a defense, cannot cope
with the many situations covered by the tort of invasion of privacy in which
the plaintiff has been outrageously humiliated although the -publication may
be true,3 2 or where the plaintiff has been put in a false but not necessarily
'Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944); Johnson v. Boeing Airplane
Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953)
'Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953).
'Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Douglas v.
Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W 849 (1912). Contra, Kelley v. Post Publishing Co.,
327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951)..
'Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243, (1944); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky.
765, 299 S.W 967 (1927)
2'Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Cason v.
Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 IlL
App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
"'Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942). The dissent is obviously perturbed by
the invasion of privacy now made possible by new scientific devices.
M48 STAT. 1103 (1934); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946)
' Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2nd. Cir. 1947)
'Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931)
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defamatory light.33 The newer tort of "mental suffering," once recognized,
may very well absorb a large number of the privacy cases, 'but at the present
time it too is struggling for acceptance.3 4 New York,35 Utah,36 and Vir-
gima37 have attempted to legislate protection of the right of privacy, but
such statutory remedies are usually confined to appropriations of the per-
sonality for commercial use, and cannot possibly hope to meet the demands
of countless fact situations arising now and in the future. It is evident,
therefore, that the tort of invasion of privacy contemplates relief in cir-
cumstances not protected by other means, and affords a solution where other
methods fail.
While it should be borne in minl that not every situation in which
privacy will be protected has arisen in any given jurisdiction, and that each
case must turn on its own particular facts, the majority of states which have
discussed the problem have decided in favor of the right of privacy. It is
now recognized in Alabama,38 Arizona, 9 California,40 Florida,4 ' Georgia,4 2
Illinois,43 Indiana,44 Kansas,45 Kentucky,4" Louisiana,4 7 Michigan,4 8 Miss-
ouri,49 Montana,50 Nevada,5 ' New Jersey, 2 North Carolina,53 Oregon,6 4
South Carolina,56 and the District of Columbia.5 6 There are indications
that the right will be recognized in several other jurisdictibns where lower 7
' Hiish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
£" Note, Mental Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 6 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 384 (1955).
"IN.Y. CirVI RIGHiTS LAw S§ 50 and 51.
wUTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-7 to -9 (1953).
'VA. CODE § 8-650 (1950).
' Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948).
'Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945)
'Kerby v, Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
"Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (19A4).
"Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
"Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952)
" Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949):
'iKunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918)
'Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W 967 (1927).
'TItzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
"Pallas v. Crowley-Milner Co., 334 Mich. 282, 54 N.W.2d 595 (1952)
"Barber v. Time Inc, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
'Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
"'Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947).
"McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945).
'Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
"Hinish v. Meter & Frank Co., 166 Ore, 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941)
'Holloman v,. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940).
'Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. 1948).
" Friedman v. Cincinnati Local, 6 Ohio Supp. 276, 20 Ohio Op. 473 (Com. PL
1941).
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or federal"8 court decisions have accepted it, or the courts have at least
avoided a decision that it does not exist.59 The right is still rejected only
in Rhode Island,60 Texas,61 and Wisconsin.6 2 The Restatement of TortsO
has approved a cause of action for "unreasonable and serious" interference
with privacy.
OHIO
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently decided that the right of
privacy exists in this jurisdiction. 64 Prior to this significant recent decision,
only four reported cases discussed the problem, and while there seemed to
be a tendency toward acceptance of the tort, these common pleas decisions
lacked the authority of a high court decision.
An interesting historical background appears in the early case of
Laktn v. Gan.65 Decided sixty years before the advent of the tort of in-
vasion of privacy, this decision reflects the attitude of a court bound by
precedent and suspicious of an injury more mental than physical. The
plaintiff had been requested by a spinster to meet her in the woods at night
and hear from her "secrets worth knowing." The defendants, who had
bribed the woman to act as a decoy, were secreted at the appointed place,
and surprised the plaintiff by suddenly rising, shouting, hallooing, blow-
ing horns and ringing bells, to plaintiffs great disturbance. Not only did
plaintiff suffer great humiliation and shock, but his status in the community
was considerably lowered by defendants' acts. He was suspected of im-
morality by his neighbors, and his creditors refused to do business with
MLeverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3rd Cit. 1951); Hazlitt v. Fawcett
Publications Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (Conn. 1953); Berg v. Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (Minn. 1948).
'McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936); Urban v.
Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292 (1952); Kelley v. Post Pub. Co.,
327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 386 (1951); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So.2d
391 (1951); Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954); Lewis v.
Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947).
'Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 At. 97 (1909).
' McCullaugh v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 4 (5th Cit. 1954).
Judevine v. Benzies-Montange Fuel and Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W
295 (1936).
135 867.
"Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) In recognizing the
right of privacy, the court said: "In Ohio the lower courts have acknowledged the
right, but counsel are agreed that it still is a matter of first impression in this court.
However, since both reason and authority are convincingly in favor of recognition of
the right, it would seem that Ohio, too, should not hesitate to take the definite step
of approving this salutary and progressive principle of law."
'Wright 14 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1831).
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him, thereby causing him a substantial pecuniary loss. In refusing relief,
the court said:
We have been much troubled upon examining the declaration, to find
out what class of actions this belongs to. The counsel for plaintiff have not
entirely relieved us, one of them contending the action is case for a
nuisance, and the other contending it is an action on the case for defama-
tion . what roght was disturbed? We do not think good policy
requires us, in this new country, to take such affairs into the cognizance
of a court of ]ustice."
In 1900 the case of Redy v. DettschU7 appeared. The plaintiff -grounded
his cause of action in libel, and sought damages from the defendant for
continuing to keep plaintiff's photograph in the rogues' gallery after the
plaintiff had been released from any suspicion of crime. In holding that
the defendant would be guilty of "libelously publishing" the plaintiff as a
rogue or thief once he was aware of the released plaintiffs picture in the
"mug books," the court anticipated the weight of authority which now
gives relief in similar situations under the doctrine of privacy.68 In such
a case, one who has not violated the law may insist on being let alone.
The first case in Ohio to discuss the right of privacy as such was Mar-
Izn v. F.I.Y Theater Co.69 The plaintiff, an actress on the legitimate stage,
sought damages on two grounds, invasion of privacy and libel The de-
fendant theater operator had exhibited enlarged pbotographs of the
plaintiff among so-called "nude" pictures of burlesque actresses on the
facade of a well-known burlesque theater. In sustaining the defendant's
demurrer to plaintiff's first cause of action for invasion of privacy, the
court examined various aspects of the new tort, found that the weight of
authority was against its recognition (erroneous, even. at that time), and
demed plaintiff's recovery because the plaintiff was a "public figure" and
had therefore consented to publicity and waived her right of privacy. This
decision seems wrong, for under the better-reasoned cases7" a public figure
does not surrender his right of privacy completely, but only consents to that
type of newsworthy publicity which does not violate the common decencies.
Humiliating publicity could do much greater injury to the career of a public
figure than that of a private person, and is particularly odious in a case
'oId. at 16, 17.
'7 Ohio N.P. 620 (1900).
'eState ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 Ia. 479,39 So. 499 (1905); McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq.
24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945).
e 10 Ohio Op. 338, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 67 (Com. Pl. 1948).
"Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Mau v. Rio
Gfrande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp, 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931). Contra: Sidis v. F-R Pul. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19
(S.D.N.Y. 1938), afirmed, 113 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1940).
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such as the instant one where an aspect of plaintiff's personality was ex-
ploited for selfish commercial gain.
The second case to discuss the right of privacy in this jurisdiction was
Johnson v. Scrpps Publishmg Co.7 1 The plaintiffs had signed a nominat-
ing petition for candidates in the Communist Party, and sought an injunc-
tion to restrain the defendant newspaper from publishing the lists of names
and addresses of the signers. In refusing relief, the court emphasized the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press and the inability of equity
to control that freedom by prior censorship. Once the plaintiffs had filed
their petition with the Secretary of State, it 'became a document of public
record open to public inspection and publication. This is in line with
the better view that the right of personal privacy is limited by the freedom
of the press to publish genuinely newsworthy items of public interest In
certain cases the interest of society in free dissemination of information will
outweigh the individual's interest in privacy.
The third case on the subject in Ohio, Friedman v. The Cinemnat;
Local,72 evidenced a desireto recognize the right of privacy, but in so doing
went too far. The plaintiff restaurant owner was found to be entitled to an
injunction restraining defendant pickets from taking pictures of plaintiff's
customers as they entered and left his establishment. In its zeal, the pro-
gressive court did not take cogmzance of the fact that the right of privacy
is a personal one and may not be asserted by third persons unless they them-
selves are brought into undesired publicity, for while the plaintiff ap-
parently was entitled to relief, the injunction should have been based on
other grounds.
The fourth case to discuss the right of privacy in Ohio was Schmuklaer v.
Ohm Bell Telephone Co.73  The defendant telephone company suspected
the plaintiff of using her non-metered social residence phone for business
calls, when she had agreed to use her metered business phone for such
purposes. The defendant monitored plaintiff's social phone in order to
determine the type of call she was making, and after being confronted by
defendant with the facts and the method used to obtain them, plaintiff
sought damages for invasion of privacy. In denying relief, the court stressed
the fraudulent actions of the plaintiff and the right of the defendant to
protect its own interest. This argument is not persuasive. Under the bet-
ter view, the plaintiff may recover for invasion of privacy where a receiv-
ing set has been placed in his room by a suspicious defendant, 74 or where his
' 18 Ohio Op. 372, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 423 (Com. Pl. 1940).
"Friedman v. The Cincinnati Local, 20 Ohio Op. 473, 6 Ohio Supp. 276 (Com.
Pleas 1941), reversed on other grounds, 90 N.E.2d 447 (1941)
" 66 Ohio L Abs. 213, 116 N.E.2d 819 (Com. Pleas 1953)
1
'McDamel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d'810
(1939).
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telephone wires have been tapped.75  In the Schmaukler case, the court
probably wished to reach an equitable result, but the decision is not good
tort law. The plaintiffs trivial deception seems to be outweighed -by the
frightening intrusions upon confidences made possible by such acts as the
defendant's, and if intrusion on privacy can be justified by a defendant's
pecuniary interest, its foundations are indeed built on sand.
The above decisions all seemed to indicate some awareness of the right of
privacy, and that awareness could not help but increase. In the important
recent decision of Housh v. Peth,76 the Supreme Court of Ohio for the
first tune discussed the right of privacy as such and affirmed its inde-
pendent legal existence. The plaintiff had been harassed by the defendant
collection bureau in order to compel the payment of a debt owed by the
plaintiff. She was subjected to numerous telephone calls by the defendant,
some of them very late at night, dunning her for payment. A number of
the calls were made to the plaintiff's superiors, informing them of the debt,
and to the plaintiff at her place of business, with a resultant threat of loss
of employment. The court recognized the fact that a creditor has a right to
take reasonable action to pursue his debtor in order to "encourage" pay-
ment, although the steps taken may result to a certain degree in the invasion
of the debtor's privacy. Simply informing the debtor's employer of the
fact that the debt is owed, of itself, would not constitute an outrageous in-
vasion of the right of privacy 7 But the court distinguished the instant
case on its facts. The campaign of harassment which the defendant con-
ducted led the court to conclude that its actions fell outside the.bounds of
reasonable methods which may be pursued in an effort to collect a debt,
and was therefore an actionable invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy.
The landmark decision in the Housh case should result in the Ohio
Bar's realization that this heretofore lirtle-used remedy is now definitely
available in this jurisdiction. In spite of the fact that Ohio has shown re-
sistance to accepting the new tort of "mental suffering,"78 the Housh de-
cision, in recognizing the right of privacy as an interest deserving pro-
tection, illustrates that an enlightened court will acknowledge the mental
as well as the physical aspects of the human personality. In so doing, the
2 Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931)
7 Housh Y. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
'Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 896
(1947); Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 '(1948); accord, Davis
v. General Finance and Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). Some
cases hold that the prited publication of a debt to the world constitutes an invasion
of the right to privacy. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W 967 (1927).
Contra: Judevine v. Benzies-Montange Fuel and Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269
N.W 295 (1936).
" Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.X.2d 735 (1948).
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